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 L-AXIOMATIZABILITY IN INTERMEDIATE AND
NORMAL MODAL LOGICS
ALEX CITKIN
Abstract. A set F of formulas is complete relative to a given class
of logics, if every logic from this class can be axiomatized by formulas
from F . A set of formulas F is  L-complete relative to a given class
of logics, if every logic of this class can be  L-axiomatized by formulas
from F , that is, every of these logics can be defined by an  L-deductive
system with axioms and anti-axioms from F and inference rules modus
ponens, modus tollens, substitution and reverse substitution. We prove
that every complete relative to ExtInt (or ExtK4) set of formulas is
 L-complete. In particular, every logic from ExtInt (or ExtK4) can be
 L-axiomatized by Zakharyaschev’s canonical formulas.
1. Introduction
Canonical formulas were introduced by M. Zakharyaschev (for details and
references see [2]). They have been instrumental in studying intermediate
and normal modal logic. The canonical formulas form a complete set of
formulas, meaning that any intermediate logic or any normal extension of
K4 can be axiomatized over intuitionistic propositional calculus (IPC) or,
respectively, over K4 by canonical formulas. Our goal is to demonstrate
that canonical formulas form the complete set not only for proving formulas
but also for deriving, while using a  Lukasiewicz-style calculi ( L-deductive
system), the rejection of formulas. We will prove a stronger statement: one
can construct  L-axiomatization of every logic from ExtInt or ExtK4 using
any given complete set of formulas.
The refutation system for various intermediate and normal modal logics
were extensively studied by T. Skura, V. Goranko (see, for instance, [7, 3]).
In [6] T. Skura observed that in case of finitely approximated logics the
Jankov formulas give the complete set of anti-axioms, that is the additional
axioms that can be used to prove refutation of a formula. The canonical
formulas are, in a way, the modified Jankov or, more precisely, frame for-
mulas. It turned out that we can effectively use the canonical formulas for
refutation.
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In Section 2, we give the background information regarding  L-deductive
systems. In Section 3, we prove that every intermediate logic has an  L-
deductive system defining it and having axioms from a given complete set of
formulas. And in Section 4, we extend this result to the normal extensions
of K4.
2.  L-Deductive Systems
2.1. Refutation Systems. Commonly, we use a deducting system in order
to prove a formula and we use semantical means in order to disprove a
formula. But the rejection of a formula can also be established syntactically.
For instance, by Modus Tollens we can derive that a formula A is refutable
if we prove A → B and disprove B.
The idea, to include the rejected propositions into proofs can be traced
back to R. Carnap 1 [1]. But J. Lukasiewicz was the first who constructed
a deductive system for proving refutability [5].
In general, there are two ways of handling the refutation syntactically:
direct and indirect. To determine weather a formula A is refutable we can
do one of the following
● derive in a meta-logic a statement about refutability of A ( L-proof -
 Lukasiewicz-style proof)
● derive from A a formula B that we already know is refutable (an
anti-axiom) and then apply Modus Tollens (i-proof - indirect proof,
Carnap’s way)
An existence of an  L-proof entails the existence of i-proof. The converse
is true under some assumptions (some weak form of the deduction theorem
[8]).
2.1.1. Examples of i-complete systems. Let Fm be a set of (propositional)
formulas and Σ be a set of all simultaneous substitutions of formulas for
(propositional) variables. Let ⊢ be a structural consequence relation, that
is, for any finite set of formula Γ ⊆ Fm and any formulas A,B ∈ Fm the
following holds
(a) A ⊢ A
(b) if Γ ⊢ A, then Γ,B ⊢ A
(c) if Γ,A ⊢ B and Γ ⊢ A, then Γ ⊢ B
(d) if Γ ⊢ A, then σ(Γ) ⊢ σ(A)
Given a consequence relation ⊢, we say that a pair of sets of formulas
⟨Ax+;Ax−⟩ is an i-complete system for ⊢ if
⊢ A if and only if
1And in traditional logic even to Aristotle and the Stoics.
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2.2. Definitions. By Fm we denote the set of all (propositional) formulas
in a given language containing → among connectives.
A logic is a subset L ⊆ Fm closed under rules Modus Ponens and Substi-
tution, i.e. for any A,B ∈ Fm and any σ ∈ Σ
A, (A → B) ∈ L entails B ∈ L and σ(A) ∈ L.
We will assume that there is a class of models (algebras, matrices, etc.)
M and for every formula A ∈ Fm it is defined whether A is valid in a given
model M (in written M ⊧ A), or not (in written M ⊭ A).
2.3.  L-deductive Systems. If A ∈ Fm is a formulas, than ⊕A and ⊖A are
(atomic) statements. ⊕A is a positive statement (assertion) and ⊖A is a
negative statement (rejection). The set of all positive statements we denote
by St+, the set of all negative statements we denote by St−, and St denotes
the set of all statements, that is, St ∶= St+ ∪ St−.
By  L-deductive system we understand a couple S ∶= ⟨Ax,R⟩, where Ax ∶=
Ax+∪Ax− and Ax+ ⊆ St+ is a set of axioms, Ax− ⊆ St− is a set of anti-axioms,
and R is a set of the following rules:
Modus Ponens ⊕(A→ B),⊕A/⊕B (MP )
Substitution ⊕A/⊕ σ(A), for all σ ∈ Σ (Sb)
Modus Tolens ⊕(A→ B),⊖B/⊖A (MT )
Reverse Substitution ⊖σ(A)/⊖A, for all σ ∈ Σ (RS)
2.4.  L-Inference. In a natural way, every deduction system S ∶= ⟨Ax,R⟩
defines an inference: if Γ is a set of statements and α is a statement, a
sequence α1, . . . , αn of statements is an inference of α from Γ if αn is α and
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} one of the following holds
(a) αi ∈ Ax
(b) αi ∈ Γ
(c) αi can be obtained from the preceding statements by one of the rules.
If there exists an inference of α from Γ, we say that α is derivable in S from
Γ, and we denote this by Γ ⊢S α (and we will omit index if no confusion
arises). The length of an inference is a number of statements in it.
If ⊙ ∈ {⊕,⊖}, then ⊙A is a statement with the sign opposite to ⊙, that
is, if ⊙ = ⊕, then ⊙ = ⊖ and if ⊙ = ⊖, then ⊙ = ⊕.
Proposition 2.1. For any  L-deductive system S, if Γ ⊆ St+, α ∈ St+ and
I ∶= α1, . . . , αn, α is an inference of α from Γ, then, omitting from I all
negative statements, the obtained sequence I+ still will be an inference of α
from Γ.
Proof. Proof by induction on the length of I.
Basis. If I contain a single statement α, the inference already consists
of only positive statements.
Inductive Hypothesis. Assume that for all inferences of the length at
most m the statement is true.
4 ALEX CITKIN
Step. Let I be an inference of α from Γ of the length m + 1. By the
definition of inference, either α ∈ Ax∪Γ, or α is obtained by some rule from
the preceding members of I. If α ∈ Ax or α ∈ Γ, then the single-element
sequence α is an inference.
Suppose α is obtained by one of the rules. Since α is a positive statement,
it can be obtained only by (MP) or (Sb). Let us consider these to cases.
A Case of (MP). Let I ∶= α1, . . . , αm, α. Suppose α is obtained by (MP)
and α = ⊕A for some A ∈ Fm. Then, for some formulaB ∈ Fm, the statements
⊕(B → A) and ⊕B occur in I. Assume ⊕B = αi and ⊕(B → A) = αj
members of I. Let 1 ≤ k ≤m be the greatest index such that αk ∈ I and αk
is a positive statement (that is, all statements αk+1, . . . , αm are negative).
Clearly, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k. Then, the first k elements I form an inference Ik
and Ik contains both of statements ⊕B and ⊕(B → A). By the inductive
hypothesis, we can omit in Ik all negative statements and obtain a new
inference I+k that contains only positive statements. It is easy to see that
the statements ⊕B and ⊕(A → B) are members of I+k . Hence, we can add
to I+k the statement ⊕A and obtain an inference of α from Γ. Note, that
obtained inference is exactly an inference obtained from I by omitting all
negative statements.
A Case of (Sb). This case can be considered in the way similar to the
case of (MP). 
Corollary 2.2. For any  L-deductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax,R⟩, if Γ ⊆ St+, α ∈ St+
and Γ ⊢S ⊕α, then there is an inference of α from Γ containing only the
positive statements.
2.5. Coherent and Full  L-deductive Systems.
Definition 2.3.  L-deductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax,R⟩ we will call coherent if for
no A ∈ Fm
⊢S ⊕A and ⊢S ⊖A.
And we will call S full if for every A ∈ Fm
⊢S ⊕A or ⊢S ⊖A.
A coherent and full system will be called standard.
If A ∈ Fm is a formula and M is a model we let
M ⊧ ⊕A ⇋M ⊧ A and M ⊧ ⊖A⇋M ⊭ A. (1)
If M ⊧ ⊙A we say that the statement ⊙A is valid in M.
We say that a model M is an adequate regular model for an  L-deductive
system S, if for every A ∈ Fm
⊢S ⊙A if and only if M ⊧ ⊙A. (2)
It is not hard to see that the following holds.
Proposition 2.4. If a given  L-deductive system S has an adequate regular
model, then the system S is standard.
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In this paper, we consider only regular models.
Let us also observe that in order to prove that a modelM is adequate for a
given  L-deductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax,R⟩ as long as all axioms and anti-axioms
are valid in M.
Proposition 2.5. Let M be a model and S ∶= ⟨Ax,R⟩ be an  L-deductive
system. If
for every A ∈ Ax,M ⊧ ⊙A,
then M is adequate for S.
Proof. The proof can be done by induction on the length of inference. In-
deed, all rules preserve the validity of statements, i.e. if the premisses of a
rule are valid in M, then the conclusion is valid too. 
2.6. Logics Defined by  L-deductive Systems. Every given deductive
system S defines the pair
⟨L+,L−⟩, where L+ ∶= {A ∈ Fm ∣⊢S ⊕A} and L
−
∶= {A ∈ Fm ∣⊢S ⊖A}
that we call a logic. The logic defined by a given  L-deductive system S we
will denote by L(S).
We say that a logic L = ⟨L+,L−⟩ is coherent, full or standard if the defining
 L-deductive system is coherent, full or, respectively, standard. It is easy to
see that a logic L is coherent if and only if L+ ∩ L− = ∅; logic L is full if and
only if L+ ∪ L− = Fm; and logic L is standard if and only if L− = Fm ∖ L+.
A logic is said to be finitely  L-axiomatizable if it can be defined by an
 L-deductive system with the finite set of axioms.
Any pair L = ⟨L+,L−⟩, where L+,L− ⊆ Fm and L+ is closed under (MP) and
(SB) and L− is closed under (MT) and (RS), is a logic. Indeed, L = ⟨L+,L−⟩
can be defined by an  L-deductive system system in which
Ax = {⊕A ∣ A ∈ L+} ∪ {⊖A ∣ A ∈ L−}.
Recall that a couple M(L) ∶= ⟨Fm,L+⟩, where L+ is a set of designated
values, is a Lindenbaum matrix of a logic L = ⟨L+,L−⟩.
Proposition 2.6. If S ∶= ⟨Ax,R⟩ is a standard  L-deductive system, the
Lindenbaum matrix of M(L(S)) is an adequate model of S.
Proof. Due to Proposition 2.5 it suffices to check that all axioms of S are
valid in M(L(S)).
Suppose ⊕A ∈ Ax. Then A ∈ L+. Recall that L+ is closed under substitu-
tions. Hence, M(L(S)) ⊧ ⊕A.
Suppose ⊖A ∈ Ax. Then A ∈ L−. Hence, M(L(S)) ⊧ ⊖A. 
2.7. The Theorem about Symmetry in ExtInt. From this point for-
ward we consider only the deductive systems S in which ⊢S ⊕(A → (B → A))
for all A,B ∈ Fm.
The meaning of the following theorem is very straightforward: if we can-
not derive a formula A in a given regular deductive system, but can derive it
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from the some set of formulas Γ, then Γ contains a formula B not derivable
in the system and, moreover, ⊖B and be  L-derived from ⊖A. In a way, the
following theorem can be regarded as a strengthening of Modus Tollens.
Theorem 2.7 (about symmetry in ExtInt). For any  L-deductive system
S ∶= ⟨Ax,R⟩ and any A1, . . . ,An,B ∈ Fm if
⊬S ⊕B and ⊕A1, . . . ,⊕An ⊢S ⊕B,
then
⊖B ⊢S ⊖Ai
for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof. We will prove the claim by induction on the length of inference of ⊕B
from ⊕A1, . . . ,⊕An. By virtue of the Proposition 2.1 we can safely assume
that the inference consists of only positive statements.
Basis. Suppose there is an inference of ⊕B from ⊕A1, . . . ,⊕An of the
length 1. Then, by the definition of inference, ⊕B = ⊕Ai for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
for ⊕B ∉ Ax, due to ⊬S ⊕B. Hence, ⊖B ⊢S ⊖Ai.
Inductive Hypothesis. Assume that if there is an inference of the
length at most m of ⊕B from ⊕A1, . . . ⊕ An, then ⊖B ⊢S ⊖Ai for some
1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Inductive Step. Let ⊕B1, . . . ,⊕Bm,⊕B be an inference of ⊕B from
⊕A1, . . . ,⊕An. The cases (a) and (b) from the definition of inference can
were considered in the basis of induction. Let us assume that the statement
⊕B is obtained by one of the rules. Due to this statement is positive, it can
be obtained only by (MP) or (Sb).
The case of (MP). Suppose Bj = ⊕(C → B) and Bk = ⊕C, where
1 ≤ j, k ≤m. There are two possible subcases:
(a) ⊢S ⊕(C → B) ;
(b) ⊬S ⊕(C → B).
Subcase (a). Suppose ⊢S ⊕(C → B). Then, ⊬S ⊕C, for ⊬S ⊕B. Note,
that the sequence ⊕B1, . . . ,⊕Bk is an inference of ⊕C from ⊕A1, . . . ,⊕An
and 1 ≤ k ≤m. Hence,by the induction hypothesis,
⊖C ⊢S ⊖Ai, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (3)
On the other hand, we can apply (MT) to ⊢S ⊕(C → B) and ⊖B and obtain
⊖B ⊢S ⊖C. (4)
And from (3) and (4) we can derive
⊖B ⊢S ⊖Ai, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (5)
Subcase (b). Suppose ⊬S ⊕(C → B). Then, we observe that ⊕B1, . . . ,⊕Bj
is an inference of ⊕(C → B) from ⊕A1, . . . ,⊕An and 1 ≤ i ≤ m. So, we can
apply the induction hypothesis and get
⊖ (C → B) ⊢S ⊖Ai for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (6)
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On the other hand, we can apply (MT) to ⊢ ⊕(B → (C → B)) and ⊖B and
obtain
⊖B ⊢S ⊖(C → B). (7)
And from (6) and (7) we can derive
⊖B ⊢S ⊖Ai, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (8)
The case of (Rs). Suppose B = σ(Bj), where 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Then ⊬S
⊕Bj, for ⊬S ⊕B. Also, note that ⊕B1, . . . ,⊕Bj is an inference of Bj from
⊕A1, . . . ,⊕An and 1 ≤ j ≤m. Hence, by the induction hypothesis,
⊖Bj ⊢S ⊖Ai for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (9)
On the other hand, ⊖B = ⊖σ(Bj) and from ⊖σ(Bj), by (RS), we have
⊖B ⊢S ⊖Bj. (10)
From (9) and (10) we have
⊖B ⊢S ⊖Ai for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (11)

3. Refutation in ExtInt
If Γ ⊆ Fm and A ∈ Fm, then by Γ ⊩ A we denote that A is derivable from
Γ in Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus (IPC) with substitution (e.g, [4,
Section 7.1.3]). Int + Γ will denote a logic axiomatized over Int by Γ, that
is Int + Γ ∶= {A ∈ Fm ∣ Γ ⊩ A}. And Γ +A means the same as Γ + {A}.
A set F of formulas is said to be complete [10] (or sufficiently rich [9])
if every logic from ExtInt can be axiomatized over Int by some formulas
from F. An obvious characterization of completeness can be given by the
following Proposition:
Proposition 3.1. A set of formulas F is complete if and only if for each
formula A such that Int /⊩ A there are formulas A1, . . . ,An ∈ F and
A1, . . . ,An ⊩ A and A ⊩ Ai for all i = 1, . . . , n. (12)
Proof. Clearly, if (12) holds, every logic from ExtInt can be axiomatized
over Int by some formulas from F.
Conversely, if F is a complete set, we can consider a logic L ∶= Int + A
axiomatized over Int by formula A. By the definition of completeness,
for some A1. . . . ,An ∈ F we have L = Int + {A1, . . . ,An}, from which (12)
immediately follows. 
Perhaps, the best known complete set of formulas is a set of canonical
formulas introduced by M. Zakharyaschev (cf. [2] for definitions, references
and history). For our purposes it is important only that canonical formulas
satisfy (12) (cf. [2, Theorem 9.44(i)]) and, thus, they form a complete set.
By IPL we denote the intuitionistic propositional logic, that is, IPL ∶= {A ∈
Fm ∣⊩ A}.
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We say that L = ⟨L+,L−⟩ is a standard intermediate logic if IPL ⊆ L+ ⊂ Fm,
and L is closed under rules Modus Ponens and Substitution.
3.1. Completeness Theorem. By Axi we will denote the set of positive
statements obtained from the axioms of IPC. And by Fmc we denote a given
complete set of all formulas (for instance, a set of all canonical formulas).
Let us note the following.
Proposition 3.2. Assume A1, . . . ,An,B ∈ Fm and S ∶= ⟨Ax,R⟩ is such an
 L-deductive system that Axi ⊆ Ax. Then
A1, . . . ,An ⊩ B, entails ⊕A1, . . . ,⊕An ⊢S ⊕B.
Proof. It is not hard to see that any inference of B from A1, . . . ,An in IPC
can be easily converted into an inference of ⊕B from ⊕A1, . . . ,⊕An in S. 
Theorem 3.3. Every intermediate logic L can be defined by a standard
deductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax,R⟩, where every axiom ⊙A ∈ Ax is as statement
obtained either from an axiom of IPC or from a formula A ∈ Fmc. In other
words, given a complete set of formulas Fmc, every intermediate logic can
be  L-axiomatized over IPC by formulas from Fmc as additional axioms and
anti-axioms.
Proof. Let L = ⟨L+,L−⟩ be an intermediate logic. Let us consider the  L-
deductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax,R⟩, where
Ax = Axi ∪ {⊕A ∣ A ∈ L+ ∩ Fmc} ∪ {⊖A ∣ A ∈ L− ∩ Fmc}, (13)
i.e. axioms of S are statements obtained from the axioms of IPC and canon-
ical formulas. We need to demonstrate that DS defines L. We will show
(a) If A ∈ L+, then ⊢S ⊕A;
(b) If A ∈ L−, then ⊢S ⊖A;
(c) S is coherent.
Note, that fullness of S immediately follows from (a) and (b). Thus, if S
enjoys (a),(b) and (c), then S is standard. Also, it is not hard to see, that if
S enjoys (a),(b) and (c), then S defines L. So, all we need to do is to prove
(a),(b) and (c).
First, we will establish coherence of the system S.
Proof of (c). Let us take a Lindenbaum matrix M(L) ∶= ⟨Fm,L+⟩. By
the definition of S all the axioms of S are valid in M(L). Hence, by the
Proposition 2.5, M(L) is an adequate model of S and, by virtue of the
Proposition 2.4, S is a standards  L-deductive system and, thus, is coherent.
Proof of (a). Assume A ∈ L+. If A is derivable in IPC, that is ⊩ A, then,
by virtue of the Proposition 3.2,
⊢S ⊕A.
Assume A ∈ L+ and A is not derivable in IPC. Then, by virtue of (12),
there are such formulas C1, . . . ,Cn ∈ Fm
c that
C1, . . . ,Cn ⊩ A.
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Then, by virtue of the Proposition 3.2,
⊕C1, . . . ,⊕Cn ⊢S ⊕A.
Recall, that by the definition of S, we have ⊕C1, . . . ,⊕Cn ∈ Ax. Hence,
⊢S ⊕A.
Proof of (b). Assume A ∈ L−. Then, by virtue of (12), there are such
formulas C1, . . . ,Cn ∈ Fm
c that
C1, . . . ,Cn ⊩ A and A ⊩ Ci for all i = 1, . . . , n. (14)
Let us observe that, due to A ∈ L−, one of the formulas Ci, i = 1, . . . , n is in
L
−. Suppose C1 ∈ L
− and, hence,
⊖C1 ∈ Ax. (15)
We already proved that system S is coherent. Thus,
⊬S ⊕C1. (16)
On the other hand, by 14,
A ⊩ C1. (17)
And, by virtue of the Proposition 3.2,
⊕A ⊢S ⊕C1. (18)
From (16) and (18), by virtue of the Theorem 2.7, we have
⊖C1 ⊢S ⊖A. (19)
And from (15) and (19) we can conclude
⊢S ⊖A.

Corollary 3.4. Every finitely  L-axiomatizable intermediate logic L can be
defined by a standard deductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax,R⟩ with finite number of
axioms and every axiom ⊙A ∈ Ax is as statement obtained from an axiom
of IPC or from a canonical formula A.
Proof. The proof immediately follows from the above Theorem and the fini-
tarity of the relation ⊢S. 
4. Refutation in NExtK4
From this point forward, Fm will denote the set of all formulas in the
signature ∧,∨,→,∼,◻.
In order to consider normal modal logics, first, we need to extend the set
R of rules by adding to (MP),(MT),(Sb) and (RS) the rules
Necessitation ⊕(A),⊕ ◻A (NS)
Reverse Necessitation ⊖◻A/⊖A (RN)
Next, we need to establish that the Theorem about symmetry holds in
NExtK4.
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Theorem 4.1 (about symmetry in NExtK4). For any  L-deductive system
S ∶= ⟨Ax,R⟩ and any A1, . . . ,An,B ∈ Fm if
⊬S ⊕B and ⊕A1, . . . ,⊕An ⊢S ⊕B,
then
⊖B ⊢S ⊖Ai
for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof. Similarly to Theorem 2.7, the proof can be done by induction on
the length of inference. We can repeat the proof of the Theorem 4.1 and
consider only the additional case for (NS).
The case of (NS). Suppose B = ⊕ ◻ Aj , where 1 ≤ j < m. Then ⊬S
⊕Aj, for ⊬S ⊕ ◻ Aj . Note, that ⊕A1, . . . ,⊕Aj is an inference of ⊕Aj from
⊕A1, . . . ,⊕Aj−1. Hence, by the induction hypothesis,
⊖Aj ⊢S ⊖Ai, for some 1 ≤ i < j. (20)
By (RN), we also have
⊖◻Aj ⊢S ⊖Aj . (21)
And, combining (20) and (21), we have
⊖◻Aj ⊢S ⊖Ai.
Recall, that B = ◻Aj, thus, we can conclude the proof of this case. 
Given a complete set of formulas, for instance, the set of canonical for-
mulas, one can prove the following theorem (using the same argument as in
proof of the Theorem 3.3).
Theorem 4.2. Every logic L ∈ NExtK4 can be defined by a standard de-
ductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax,R⟩, where every axiom ⊙A ∈ Ax is as statement
obtained from an axiom of K4 or from a canonical formula A. In other
words, every logic from NExtK4 can be  L-axiomatized by canonical formu-
las as additional axioms.
And, similarly to intermediate logics, the following holds.
Corollary 4.3. Every finitely  L-axiomatizable logic L ∈ NExtK4 can be
defined by a standard deductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax,R⟩ with finite number of
axioms and every axiom ⊙A ∈ Ax is as statement obtained from an axiom
of K4 or from a canonical formula A.
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